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1. Davidson, non-ergodicity and 
individuals 
John B. Davis 
The distinctiveness of post Keynesian economic theory from both neoclassi-
cal and neoRicardian economic theory rests in large degree on the former's 
emphasis on fundamental uncertainty. Paul Davidson has emphasized this 
difference time and again, arguing that Keynes 's own thinking was most 
revolutionary in its attention to uncertainty, especially in regard to the analy-
sis of liquidity and the properties of a monetary production economy. Partly 
in response to this insight, a 'fundamentalist Keynesianism' has developed in 
recent years that traces Keynes 's understanding of uncertainty to his early 
Treatise on Probability account of probability in terms of degrees of belief 
(for example, Carabelli, 1988; O' Donnell, 1989). However, Davidson's treat-
ment of uncertainty is explicitly rooted in a rejection of the idea that reality is 
an ergodic system, that is , an immutable, unchanging set of processes that 
eternally replicate past patterns of events. In his view, the world is non-
ergodic, because important aspects of the future are created by human action. 
Thus though there is an epistemological dimension to his discussions of 
uncertainty that is not incompatible with an explanation of expectations in 
terms of degrees of belief, it is important to recognize that the idea that 
economic reality is non-ergodic is not an epistemological one, but rather an 
ontological one. Even more important for Davidson's understanding of un-
certainty is the priority of this ontological claim over any epistemological 
claims regarding limitations on human information processing. Simon's 
bounded rationality conception, for example, .looked at in purely epistemo-
logical terms involves what appears to be a rather fundamental sort of uncer-
tainty. However, in Davidson's view, that Simon supposes the world is ergodic 
makes his conception close kin to Savage's expected utility analysis, and 
separates it off entirely from Keynes's more radical understanding of uncer-
tainty (Davidson, 1995, p. 109). Uncertainty, then, cannot be understood 
solely in epistemological terms, and depends in the first instance on a correct 
understanding of the nature of reality itself. 
To elaborate on this ontological theme, and to develop further the charac-
teristically post Keynesian conception of uncertainty, this chapter sets forth 
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an account of the functioning of a non-ergodic economic world in terms of 
the behaviour of individuals operating both within and upon conventions and 
institutions. In a non-ergodic world, according to Davidson, individual eco-
nomic agents make choices on the assumption that the world is transmutable. 
They also, he emphasizes, rely upon conventions and institutions to stabilize 
and improve patterns of outcomes. Yet if the future is transformed in impor-
tant respects as a result of human action, we must allow, first, that conven-
tions and institutions may themselves be transformed - intentionally and 
unintentionally - by human action, and, second, that the transformation of 
conventions and institutions may in turn serve to transform the basis on 
which individuals themselves subsequently act as economic agents. In this 
non-ergodic picture of reciprocal influences of social structures and indi-
vidual agency upon one another, post Keynesians have emphasized how 
conventions and institutions influence the behaviour of individuals, in part as 
a corrective to neoclassicism's atomistic individualism. Left largely 
unexamined, however, is how the theory of the individual economic agent 
needs to be re-developed, both to complete the picture of the economic 
process as non-ergodic, and to replace the static, ergodic view of individuals 
as atomistic agents in neoclassical economic theory. 
Thus this chapter seeks to develop along Davidsonian lines Keynes's own 
General Theory account of the nature of individuals, linking it to Keynes 's 
account of conventions, in order to better describe the nature of uncertainty in 
a non-ergodic world. The first section of the chapter begins with a brief 
summary of Davidson's recent thinking on non-ergodicity, in order to draw 
out the implications of his ontological view of uncertainty. An important 
aspect of this view is the idea that individuals operate both within and upon 
conventions and other institutional structures. The second section of the 
chapter then examines critically neoclassical thinking about the nature of 
individuals, in order to set the stage for discussion of the understanding of 
individuals to be found in Keynes's thinking. Though neoclassicism is metho-
dologically individualist, ironically its account of the nature of the indi-
vidual can be shown to be seriously flawed in two important respects. The 
third section of the chapter examines Keynes's views on the nature of indi-
viduals in two locations in The General Theory, and then turns to one post 
Keynesian interpretation of the nature of the relations between individuals. 
An important argument of the chapter that appears in this section is that 
Keynes did not reason in terms of organic connection. The fourth and final 
section of the chapter makes concluding remarks about Keynesian uncer-
tainty in connection with individuals and conventions. 
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DAVIDSON ON NON-ERGODICITY 
On an ergodic view of the world, reality is immutable and unchanging in the 
sense that the basic causal relations governing the world never change and 
always hold in all circumstances. Though we observe variation at the level of 
events, individuals, and particular practices, the principal cause-and-effect 
relationships underlying their variety and flux are themselves understood to 
be constant and unchanging. That is, just as in natural science the law of 
gravity always holds, so in economics and social science behaviour is always 
explained in terms of essentially the same causal relationships, irrespective of 
changing social conditions and historical development. Thus economics is 
the study of a single set of underlying relationships. And, as there can never 
be new relationships and new cause-and-effect patterns generated by chang-
ing historical circumstances, economists are able to continually refine and 
build upon earlier insights, so that economic knowledge may be represented 
as always involving cumulative advance and progress. 
Davidson identifies one such purported advance as twentieth-century meth-
ods for modelling of economic agents' informational capacities (1995). 
Whereas nineteenth-century classical economists effectively assumed that 
individuals operated in a world of perfect certainty, contemporary orthodox 
economists assume that individuals predict future outcomes by estimating 
their probabilities based on past and present market data. There are a variety 
of such probabilistic approaches, ranging from new classical theories that 
postulate rational expectations in the short run to New Keynesian, expected 
utility, bounded rationality, and Austrian views that suppose that the future is 
not completely known in the short run due to limitations in human cognitive 
ability. However, all these views share what Davidson terms the 'Darwinian 
story' that economic agents who fail to adapt their subjective probabilities to 
the world's immutable objective probabilities do not survive (p. \07). Thus 
contemporary orthodox thinkers still share with the classical economists the 
idea that there is a single, determinate, unchanging economic reality. Their 
' progress ' on classical economics is merely to add that economic agents may 
fail in the pursuit of their objectives not only because they may make poor 
economic decisions (as the classicals allowed), but also because they may fail 
to forecast future conditions successfully however good their economic 
decision-making. 
For Keynes, on the other hand, the world is transmutable or non-ergodic in 
the sense that the principles underlying the phenomena we observe are his-
torically specific and may change with development in the economy's struc-
ture. The passing of the age of entrepreneurship and owner-led firms was an 
important change in the economy's structure of organization. Consequently, 
as he stressed in his critique of Tinbergen's econometric methodology, 
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economic time series may often not be stationary, because the underlying 
economic environment can be 'non-homogeneous through time' (Keynes, XIV, 
p. 285). This is not, however, what all commentators emphasize when dis-
cussing Keynes on uncertainty. Rather they often point to statements such as 
Keynes made in 1937 in his Quarterly Journal of Economics response to his 
critics that regarding much of what will take place in the future, 'We simply 
do not know' (Keynes, XN, p. 113). It is true, of course, that in situations of 
true uncertainty decision-makers do not know enough to form reliable prob-
ability judgements regarding future events. But that they do not is first and 
foremost a matter of the fact that the future will not sufficiently resemble the 
past so as to permit such judgements. Were, contrary to fact, the future to 
closely resemble the past, and were there still significant limitations in our 
capacity to process information (as clearly there are), uncertainty could then 
be modelled as behaviour under risk. What is requiredior radical uncertainty, 
then, is merely the fact that the future will not be like the past in important 
respects, that is , that historical data do not provide a reliable statistical basis 
for drawing inferences about future outcomes (Davidson, 1991; also cf. Hicks, 
1979 and Davidson , 1994). When Keynes said that we cannot even begin to 
know what the future may hold, he simply meant to indicate that the future 
would be different in more ways than he or anyone else could imagine. 
This emphasis may strike some as unnecessary, but saying that Keynesian 
uncertainty rests on the ontological proposition that the world is non-ergodic 
serves an important purpose. Namely, it encourages us to ask why cause-and-
effect relations underlying the phenomena we observe should be thought to 
be historically specific. For Davidson , the answer is straightforward. Saying 
that the world is non-ergodic is equivalent to saying that it is transmutable, 
where this means the economic world may be transformed in fundamental 
ways as a consequence of human agency. That is, human beings are free to 
change not just the course of events (as orthodox thinkers allow), but are also 
free to change the very principles governing the economic process. It is this 
that produces radical Keynesian uncertainty regarding the future. We gener-
ally do not - cannot - know what the future will hold, because the future is 
yet to be determined, or better, will be determined in large degree by our 
actions. Uncertainty consequently cannot be treated as risk in all but the most 
trivial situations, because human action continually re-determines the fre-
quency distributions of phenomena in which we are interested . 
This does not imply, Davidson emphasizes, that economic policy is power-
less. True, if economic policy is conceived of as designing specific courses of 
action that rely on accurate forecasts about what path the economy is likely to 
take, policy is unlikely to be successful. However, if economic policy is 
rather thought to have the design of institutional arrangements that tend to 
mitigate the undesirable effects of human action as its chief objective, then its 
Davidson, non-ergodicity and individuaLs 5 
prospects are more promising. Keynes 's insight was that laissez-faire econo-
mies lack endogenous forces to drive them to full employment equilibria. 
Essentially the behaviour of individuals and the framework of free market 
institutions within which they operate permits series of mutually reinforcing 
contractions of demand that ultimately expire below full employment 
equilibria. However, different sorts of institutions may be devised that lack 
this character, and which rather tend to raise demand and employment. 
Keynes's call for 'a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment' 
(VIII, p. 378) was meant as just the sort of institutional reform that might 
accomplish this . Economic policy for Keynes and Davidson, then, aims at 
institutional change designed to improve patterns of interaction between 
individuals and the institutions within which they operate to achieve goals 
such as low unemployment. 
At the same time, however, when individuals operate upon institutions in 
an effort to bring about policy goals, on a non-ergodic view of the world and 
economic policy we must also suppose that their actions will be influenced 
and conditioned by both the institutions they modify as well as new institu-
tions that emerge. That is, a non-ergodic view of the world also tells us that 
social structure and individual agency have reciprocal effects on one another, 
so that individuals and institutions are continually evolving in relation to one 
another. In contrast, neoclassical economists suppose that the underlying 
principles operating in economic life are stable and unchanging, and thus 
generally also suppose that the nature of individuals and institutions in which 
they operate is set and unchanging. New Institutionalists do allow that insti-
tutions evolve, but still maintain that individuals are unchanging in nature, so 
that the institutional environment adapts to human action, but not the reverse. 
This suggests that on a non-ergodic view of individuals and institutions we 
ought to be able to demonstrate that in an historical economic process indi-
viduals are transformed along with institutions. Demonstrating this requires 
developing a new understanding of the individual alternative to that em-
ployed in neoclassicism - the subject taken up in section three below. Before 
turning to that task, the following section accordingly attempts to diagnose 
the problems inherent in the neoclassical conception of the individual to 
create guidelines for a better account. 
THE NEOCLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
Two problems are diagnosed here: one concerning the standard characteriza-
tion of individuals as collections of preferences, and the other concerning 
how individuals relate to social context. 
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(i) Neoclassical economic theory assumes individuals are unchanging in 
nature. This implies that across any set of changes in an individual's environ-
ment, the theory must successfully demonstrate that any given individual 
remains in essence the selfsame individual. Alternatively, central to any con-
ception of individuals as unchanging in nature is an account of what makes 
any individual consistently distinct from all other individuals. On the neo-
classical view, of course, individuals are distinguished as distinct collections 
of preferences. But can this conception of the individual successfully distin-
guish individuals as distinct beings? In Davis (1995), I argued that for neo-
classicism the idea of individuals having distinct collections of preferences is 
equivalent to saying that individuals have their own sets of preferences. In 
effect, since preferences themselves are defined entirely subjectively or only 
in terms of the individuals to whom they belong, they must always be some 
individual 's own preferences. But using individuals ' OWl! preferences to dis-
tinguish individuals through change is question-begging in that it presup-
poses the very individuals those preferences are meant to distinguish. If a set 
of own preferences picks out some individual, they must naturally be that 
particular individual's preferences and not someone else's preferences. But if 
we have already picked out the individual to whom a set of preferences 
belongs in order to call these preferences that particular individual's own 
preferences, we cannot then turn around, and use those preferences as a 
criterion for distinguishing individuals from one another. 
In short, neoclassical theory 's criterion for distinguishing and defining 
individuals is circular and question-begging. The general problem with con-
ceptualizing the individual as a collection of subjective preferences can be 
seen from a different perspective if we ask how the view holds up when we 
consider the possibility that individuals ' preferences may change. Stigler and 
Becker (1977), in what has become the accepted position on the subject, 
sought specifically to rule out this case, insisting that preferences do not 
change. Their professed reason for doing so was entirely ad hoc in that they 
simply wished to explain choice solely in terms of changes in prices and 
incomes . But perhaps they were also aware that were an individual to be 
distinguished in terms of one set of preferences at one point in time, and then 
distinguished according to another set of preferences at another point in time, 
continuity of individual identity would require there to be something more to 
being an individual than just having preferences, thus demonstrating that 
individuals could not be explained solely in terms of preferences. Note that 
one common sense view of why preferences change is that individuals are 
influenced by their environment. Adults do not have the same preferences 
they had as infants, because of their subsequent experience. But this sort of 
answer is incompatible with characterizing individuals solely in terms of 
. their subjective preferences. The Stigler-Becker strategy can thus be seen as 
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a means of closing off investigation of the inadequacy of the neoclassical 
conception of the individual. 
(ii) Another manifestation of the problems involved in the neoclassical 
approach to explaining individuals concerns the way that the call for 
micro foundations for macroeconomics tends to be addressed. For most pro-
ponents of microfoundations, the basic rationale behind the claim that macro-
economic relationships need to be grounded in microeconomic ones is that 
the latter concern the behaviour of individuals, whereas the former concern 
aggregative relationships based on the behaviour of groups of individuals . 
Individuals are ostensibly real entities, but groups of individuals are claimed 
to be mere conceptual constructions, and thus one step removed from the 
real. New classical and new Keynesian economists consequently favour what 
may be termed individualist-reductionist type explanations of macroeco-
nomic relationships, supposing that good explanation is always explanation 
in terms of really existing things. 
However, it is doubtful that individualist-reductionist microfoundational 
accounts of macroeconomic relationships can ever be successful. Not only do 
such accounts require that macroeconomic relationships be explained in terms 
of the behaviour of households and firms but they also require that the 
choices of households and firms ultimately be explained in terms of the 
choices of individuals within households and firms. This latter condition 
involves an analysis of individuals ' strategic interaction, the province of 
game theory, where research has shown that determinate results are either 
available in only the most trivial situations or depend upon our assuming that 
conventions and institutions create a framework for individual interaction 
(Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, pp. 204ff.). In the latter case, as we 
!TIust presuppose conventions and institutions in order to explain individual 
choice, conventions and institutions cannot be said to be mere conceptual 
constructions, but must be, like individuals, real constituents of the world. 
Thus as individuals are not the on ly real things that exist, there is no reason to 
think that groups of individuals are not real as well , and consequently no 
special reason for an individualist-reductionism. 
An alternative conception of the microfoundations project aims at reducing 
macroeconomic relationships to accounts of rational optimizing behaviour 
not associated with the choices of particular individuals. Representative agent 
models assume that the choices of any number of diverse individuals in a 
single sector of the economy can be treated as the choices of one 'representa-
tive' rational optimizing agent. What proponents of this approach might be 
said to assume is that microeconomics has a better developed structure than 
macroeconomics, and thus on unity of science grounds we should strive to 
make the latter conform to the former (Janssen, 1993). Of course in the face 
of such difficulties as the Sonnenschein- Mantel-Debreu results it is hard to 
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believe that microeconomics either has a very well developed analytical 
structure or one obviously superior to macroeconomics . Moreover, it is hardly 
clear that the choices of representative agents coincide with aggregate choices 
of heterogeneous individuals (Kirman, 1992). And finally, the unity of sci-
ence goal , while commendable in the abstract, may simply not apply to sub-
disciplines of a subject that are fundamentally different in nature. 
But more interesting for purposes of the discussion here is that proponents 
of this approach to microfoundations believe that rational optimizing behav-
iour need not be associated with actual individuals at all. Though the analysis 
was originally developed with actual individuals in mind, that the analysis 
can be used without reference to individuals suggests that it is not very 
closely tied to the task of characterizing real world individuals. In effect, 
then , rational optimizing could be said to not be a means of distinguishing 
actual individuals. This conclusion recalls the problem with individualist-
reductionist micro foundational explanations. There the microfoundations 
project obscures the role of conventions and institutions that help to structure 
bargaining between individuals. In rational optimizing-reductionist explana-
tions, on the other hand, whether conventions and institutions underlie ra-
tional optimizing is ultimately irrelevant, because that analysis need not even 
be about distinct individuals. 
(iii) The two sorts of problems with the neoclassical conception of the 
individual described in (i) and (ii) above may be said to be associated with 
two different types of considerations involved in developing an adequate 
conception of individuals . In (i) , the issue is how we account for the subjec-
tivity or subjective side of individuals. The neoclassical strategy of tying this 
aspect of individuals to own preferences clearly represents an unsuccessful 
way of getting at individuals' distinctiveness from one another. In (ii), the 
issue is how we account for the social embedded ness of individuals, or 
alternatively the issue is how we position individuals in social settings. This 
might be termed the objective side of individuals. Neoclassical theory was 
found wanting in this regard, in that its highly atomistic view of individuals 
either compels it to ignore individuals ' social context or treat choice as 
disembodied. 
A post Keynesian conception of individuals consequently needs to explain 
both what distinguishes individuals from one another - individuals ' subjective 
side - and how individuals are positioned with respect to one another in social 
frameworks - individuals' social embeddedness or objective side. Moreover, it 
needs to do this in an account of a non-ergodic world in which individuals 
operate within and upon conventions and institutions. In the following section 
we first look at two locations in The General Theory in which Keynes ad-
dressed each of the two sorts of considerations involved here, and then turn to 
analysis of one post Keynesian approach to explaining individuals. 
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KEYNES AND POST KEYNESIANS ON INDIVIDUALS 
(i) Keynes devoted the generally overlooked, ninth chapter of The General 
Theory, 'The propensity of consume: II. The subjective factors', to discussion 
of the subjective side of individuals. That the chief focus of the chapter is 
those 'motives or objects of a subjective character which lead individuals to 
refrain from spending out of their incomes' (VII, p. 107; emphasis added) 
demonstrates that Keynes was not looking upon individuals only in their 
capacity as consumers. Rather, since he was on the whole concerned with 
whether the economy's lower consumption was made up by higher invest-
ment, he was interested in the full range of motivations involved in individual 
economic behaviour from the perspective of their possible impact upon the 
propensity to consume. Indeed, following the list of eight motives that lead 
individuals involved in consumption to refrain from spending Keynes then 
appended four 'motives largely analogous to, but not identical with, those 
actuating individuals' on the part of those in 'Central and Local Government 
... Institutions and ... Business Corporations ' to refrain from spending. 
The first eight motives are precaution, foresight, calculation, improvement, 
independence, enterprise, pride and avarice. The added four motives are 
enterprise, liquidity, improvement, and financial prudence (pp. 107-9). Be-
sides compiling the list, Keynes briefly describes each motive. For example, 
improvement is characterized as the motive: 
To enjoy a gradually increasing expenditure, since it gratifies a common instinct 
to look forward to a gradually improving standard of life rather than the contrary, 
even though the capacity for enjoyment may be diminishing. 
Independence is characterized as the motive: 
To enjoy a sense of independence and the power to do things, though without a 
clear idea or definite intention of specific action. 
The four motives in the second list, in contrast, pertain directly to individuals' 
own appreciation or sense of the financial concerns of government and busi-
ness in which they are employed. 
One reason few readers of The General Theory have paid much attention to 
the book's ninth chapter is that what Keynes treats as objective factors deter-
mining the propensity to consume in the previous chapter are central to his 
' fundamental psychological law' that individuals are disposed to increase 
their consumption as their income increases, but by not as much. Indeed in a 
comment upon how his subjective factors influence the propensity to con-
sume, Keynes notes that, on account of slow change in society'S organization, 
habits , capital, and distribution of wealth that form the 'main background ' to 
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these subjective factors, attention can be focused upon 'short-period changes 
in consumption [that) largely depend on changes in the rate at which income 
. .. is being earned and not on changes in the propensity to consume out of a 
given income' (pp. 109, 110). But of chief interest here is how Keynes under-
stands individuals' subjective side. 
In contrast to the neoclassical conception, Keynes's motives are not treated 
as tastes entirely specific to particular individuals - thus as necessarily own 
preferences - but as types of motivations all individuals possess that may be 
observed in different combinations in particular individuals. To signal as much 
Keynes capitalizes the name of each motive (,Precaution ... Pride . .. Extrava-
gance'), as if to imply he is referring to widely observed character traits of 
individuals. The effect of this is to root the subjective side of individuals in the 
language of a highly familiar psychology, while yet particularizing individuals 
in terms of the specific combinations of motives they exercise. The circularity 
of the neoclassical account is avoided, because the language of motivation 
employed is not solely a matter of the isolated individual's mental contents. 
Precaution, Pride, and so on represent psychological orientations tied to types 
of circumstances in which individuals may find themselves. This implies that 
individuals are distinct from one another not just according to the combinations 
of motives they exhibit, but also according to the particular social-historical 
settings they occupy in which these various motives are exhibited. Two layers 
of content additional to what is found in the neoclassical conception of the 
individual thus individuate Keynes's economic actors: that they react in ways 
others may not according to the combination of motives they each exhibit, and 
that their doing so is occasioned by their own particular circumstances, where 
that includes the 'main background' to subjective motives in the form of social 
organization, habits, distribution of wealth, and so on. 
(ii) Turning from the issue of individuals' subjective side to the issue of 
their social embeddedness, or how individuals are positioned with respect to 
one another, we come to passages in The General Theory more familiar and 
more often quoted. In Chapter Thirteen Keynes explains uncertainty as to the 
future rate of interest as a foundation of liquidity preference. Recalling his 
Treatise on Malley he notes that 'different people' - bulls and bears - 'will 
estimate the prospects differently' (p. 169), and: 
the individual , who believes that future rates of interest will be above the rates 
assumed by the market, has reason for keeping actual liquid cash ... whilst the 
individual who differs from the market in the other direction will have a motive 
for borrowing money for short periods in order to purchase debts of longer term. 
(p. 170) 
That is, explaining liquidity preference, an attitude towards the importance of 
holding money in an uncertain environment, requires that we understand how 
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individuals differentiate themselves with respect to others and the prevailing 
state of affairs, namely, market-determined interest rates. Relatedly, in the 
preceding twelfth chapter on investment and long-term expectation, Keynes 
states that speculators focus on the state of 'average expectation ' (p. 151) 
regarding the worth of various investments, in order to figure out how to 
'outwit the crowd' (p. 155), and do better than 'what average opinion believes 
average opinion to be' (p. 159). That is, individuals again position themselves 
with respect to established ways of seeing things, in order to mark out their 
own course of action. 
In these passages and elsewhere in The General Theory Keynes addresses 
how individuals particularize themselves in institutional contexts. The con-
trast with neoclassical reductionist arguments is instructive. The latter aim to 
fully translate social-institutional economic settings into the choices of indi-
viduals, but either end up presupposing those settings (individualist-
reductionism), or fail to account for the activity of individuals altogether 
(rational optimizing reductionism). Keynes 's approach, on the other hand, 
situates individuals in conventional and institutional frameworks from the 
outset, and uses these frameworks to explain how individuals act differently 
from one another. This treatment of individual action as embodied in a social 
environment - rather than obscuring the place of individuals in the economic 
process, as might be claimed from a neoclassical perspective - serves to 
identify the specific impact and roles individuals have in concrete settings. It 
constitutes a non-reductionist form of explanation that acquires explanatory 
power by juxtaposing agents and institutions. 
(iii) For Keynes, then, individuals both possess a subjective side that 
exhibits shared human traits, and operate in social settings that distinguish 
them from one another in terms of their separate courses of action. How do 
these aspects of his thinking about individuals play into our conception of 
the economy as non-ergodic? Davidson characterizes a non-ergodic economy 
as one in which human action may transform basic cause-and-effect rela-
tionships, yet one in which individuals operate within and upon conven-
tions and institutions . Relatedly, Lawson, in discussing the relationship 
between human agency and social structure in an uncertain world, empha-
sizes that 'human agency and social structure each presuppose the other, 
although neither can be reduced to the other, or identified with, or ex-
plained completely in terms of, it ' (1995, p. 83). For both Davidson and 
Lawson, it thus seems fair to say, individuals and institutions maintain a 
relative autonomy which is central to our accounting for their reciprocal 
effects on one other. My argument regarding Keynes 's thinking about indi-
viduals is that he places a similar emphasis on the relative autonomy of 
individuals (and institutions) to explain uncertainty in the economy. In the 
balance of the discussion in this section, then, I elaborate further on what 
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relative autonomy implies, and how it operates in Keynes 's characterization 
of individuals. 
To further explain relative autonomy, it is best to contrast it with a stronger 
type of relationship between individuals and institutions that one school of 
post Keynesianism has recently advocated, namely, organic connection. The 
characterization of Keynes as an organicist dates to Brown-Collier (1985) 
and has more recently been defended in a 1995 collection of papers on 
Keynes and uncertainty by Carabelli, Dow, Hillard, Rotheim and Winslow, 
with Hillard asserting that it is ' now generally accepted among Post Keynesians 
that Keynes denied the atomistic ontology of classical economics and adopted 
an organicist mode of analysis' ( 1995, p. 257). Clearly post Keynesians agree 
that Keynes did reject a classical atomist ontology of economic agents. The 
passages above and their discussion indicate as much. But did he believe that 
individuals and social structures were organically related - a philosophical 
conception associated with the turn of the century ~ritish neoHegelian ideal-
ist thought of Bradley, Bosanquet and McTaggart, which Keynes 's philo-
sophical mentors Moore and Russell explicitly rejected? And is this proposition 
widely accepted among post Keynesians? Let us consider the nature of 
organicist thinking and its implications. 
Organicism, or organic connection, is an ontological thesis concerning the 
nature of relations between things. Specifically, things are organically or 
internally related if their very natures depend upon or may be reduced to their 
relations to one another. More accurately, relations are real and exist, while 
the things they relate, their relata, are aspects of relations. In contrast, exter-
nal relations exist between things if the latter are not reducible to their 
relations to other things. On this view, relations may be thought of as aspects 
of the things they relate, but they may also be thought of as real phenomena 
alongside real things, the latter sometimes distinguished as particulars 
(Strawson, 1959). A view sometimes taken for organicism is holism, a multi-
level whole-part form of analysis that focuses on principles that apply only to 
the whole of some set of things, or are emergent at the level of the whole. 
However, holist arguments are typically not organicist, as the idea of princi-
ples emergent at the level of the whole, as for example when we say human 
thought is something over and above physico-chemical brain states, normally 
precludes our reducing talk about parts to talk about the whole, or that we 
translate our understanding of brain states into talk about human thought. 
This difference between holist and organicist reasoning helps to isolate one 
of the chief characteristics of the latter. Like atomist reasoning, though in 
precisely the opposite sense, organicist views are reductionist. As things that 
are internally related to one another are only aspects of the relations that 
connect them, good organicist explanation is devoted to translating or reduc-
ing seemingly self-subsistent things into relata so as to explain the world as 
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pure relation. Just as atomism has it that only individuals exist, the doctrine 
of organicism is that only relations exist. In contrast, holist argument involves 
a multi-level form of explanation. That human thought inheres in brain states, 
but is at the same time so unlike them, helps account for thought as a distinct 
principle over and above the collection of brain states which support it. 
Human thought, that is, involves a distinctive principle of the whole, just 
because it is closely associated with and also fundamentally different from 
the physico-chemical processes which underlie it. Thus holist argument oper-
ates on two levels, neither of which is reducible to the other, and both of 
which are required to explain the phenomenon in question. 
A good case can be made for saying that Keynes used this holistic form of 
reasoning in important ways in The General Theory. Consider the paradox of 
savings as a multi-level explanation. The force of the paradox derives from 
the fact that individual savings behaviour produces contrary movements in 
aggregate savings. Thus two different concepts of savings are juxtaposed in 
the analysis. Now organicists might claim that the proper meaning of savings 
is that associated with the aggregate savings-income relationship, and that 
the concept of individual savings is derivative and ultimately reducible in 
some way to the aggregate notion. This claim does have a certain plausibility 
to it, but only when we stress linguistic meanings and interpretation as the 
appropriate level of analysis. Keynes, however, was not interested in debates 
over the linguistic interpretation of savings. Rather he believed one could 
isolate a real mechanism operating in the economy whereby increases in 
individual savings produced decreases in aggregate savings. Moreover, the 
mechanism he modelled depended upon individual and aggregate savings 
being irreducibly distinct phenomena. His paradox had force, that is, just 
because individuals could really do one thing, and something else really 
happened in the aggregate. 
A number of the proponents of the organicist interpretation of Keynes 
represent organic connection as interdependence. Interdependence between 
two things might be said to exist when each has effects on the other, which 
then change the behaviour of each, so that they then have different effects on 
one another, which then again changes the behaviour of each, and so on. If 
we expand this picture to n number of things, it might be argued that the 
system of interdependent effects becomes so complicated that we mayor 
must ignore detailed connections, and simply focus on a principle that de-
scribes the whole process. In effect, the parts reduce to the whole, because 
the parts have no real significance relative to the significance of the process 
of the whole. Interdependence on such a view collapses into organic relation. 
This is a perfectly coherent and reasonable argument in regard to some 
processes. The question at hand , however, is whether Keynes employed it in 
The General Theory. Did Keynes regard all interdependent processes as 
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collapsing into organic ones? Hillard (1995) argues that Keynes showed the 
flaws in classical economics when he demonstrated that investment and sav-
ings were (organically) interdependent via the latter's dependence on income. 
Rotheim (1995) argues that Keynes 's entrepreneurs form expectations based 
on social factors rather than just information internal to the firm, and that this 
indicates the organically interdependent nature of the investment decision. 
But note that in both cases what Keynes does is give a better explanation of 
the mechanisms and the system of interdependence involved. Savings depend 
on income. Entrepreneurs attend to conventions. In neither case does Keynes 
reduce or translate concepts pertaining to the economy's parts into concepts 
pertaining to the economy as a whole. Rather he explains the economy as a 
whole specifically by exhibiting it as a particular system of interdependencies. 
This is a holist, not organicist, form of argument, and to call it the latter 
seems only to obscure the meaning of interdependence. 
Returning, then, to the characterization of a non-ergodic economy offered 
by Davidson and Lawson as a process of reciprocal effects between agents 
and conventions, we need to ask whether this particular conception of inter-
dependency ought to be taken as an example of organic connection. Clearly 
what bothers proponents of the organicist interpretation the most is the notion 
that the only alternative to their view is that Keynes held to a traditional 
atomist methodology (e.g. Carabelli, 1995, p. 141; Hillard , 1995, p. 257). 
Then, re-casting interdependence as organic connection, they conclude that 
individuals cannot be understood atomistically, because on the organic view 
things related are but aspects of the relations that involve them. But the 
premise of this argument - that without organic connection individuals must 
be conceived atomistically - is false, and not one entertained by Keynes. 
As the discussion at the beginning of this section shows, in The General 
Theory Keynes not only used an understanding of individuals different from 
the one we find in neoclassical theory, but his conception has advantages over 
the neoclassical one in the way he frames individuals' subjective side and in 
the way he accounts for their social embedded ness. Indeed these strategies 
permit him to avoid the problems neoclassical theory encounters in its view 
of individuals as atomistic agents. Essentially, on Keynes 's view individuals 
may be transformed in important respects according to change in the contexts 
in which they operate. On the neoclassical understanding, on the other hand, 
atomistic individuals are unchanging and uninfluenced in their basic nature 
by the contexts in which they operate. 
This difference is significant for an understanding of the economy as non-
ergodic. It means that we can analyse the historical evolution of the economy 
in terms of series of reciprocal effects that individuals and conventions/ 
institutions have upon one another. In particular, policies aimed at conven-
tions and institutions can be designed to change individuals' interaction in 
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ways that improve social well-being. At the same time, that individuals have 
effects on the way conventions and institutions operate tells us that policy 
design always involves unintended consequences. Basically, then, our grasp 
of the economy as an evolutionary process depends upon our grasping that 
there are two distinct poles or levels involved in the economy: agency and 
structure. Saying that the economy is non-ergodic means we need to trace 
how these evolve together in terms of their mutual impacts upon one another. 
On the other hand, saying that individuals and conventionslinstitutions are 
organically connected removes from view the project of sorting out this 
system of reciprocal effects. 
KEYNESIAN UNCERTAINTY: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The project of explaining the economy as non-ergodic places thinking about 
historical process in the foreground. But an historical process is susceptible 
of analysis even when uncertainty and animal spirits are regularly observed. 
The charge of nihilism advanced by Coddington (1982) only applies if we do 
not have methods for explaining the state of uncertainty and animal spirits at 
different historical junctures. Runde (1991) has shown that for Keynes the 
impact of uncertainty varies according to different decision-making contexts, 
and thus that uncertainty need not imply unstable beliefs. On the view here, 
we may begin to understand variation in decision-making contexts and the 
consequent state of uncertainty at different points in time in terms of the 
evolution of interaction between individuals and the economic structures 
within and upon which they operate. More attention on my part to Keynes's 
thinking about expectations and the interaction between individuals and con-
ventions appears in Davis (1994). Here attention is focused upon the nature 
of individuals as relatively autonomous agents on account of the importance 
of developing a post Keynesian analysis of agency. 
Post Keynesians have emphasized the importance of conventions and insti-
tutions in the economy, but have given less attention to how to characterize 
the activity of individuals within this framework. Davidson's treatment of 
uncertainty in ontological terms suggests a way to develop this analysis . A 
non-ergodic economy is one in which individuals possess a relative au-
tonomy that is exhibited in the system of reciprocal effects individuals and 
conventions/institutions have upon one another. To trace such a system of 
reciprocal effects, both the influence of agents upon economic structure and 
the reverse need to be explained. This chapter draws on Keynes to identify 
elements of a theory of the nature of the individual for this purpose. 
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